relayscan.io

MEV-Boost Stats for 2025-10-17

2025-10-17 00:00 2025-10-17 23:59 (UTC)

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Relay Payloads Percent
relay.ultrasound.money 3,449 28.12 %
bloxroute.max-profit.blxrbdn.com 3,176 25.89 %
titanrelay.xyz 2,420 19.73 %
bloxroute.regulated.blxrbdn.com 1,748 14.25 %
aestus.live 494 4.03 %
boost-relay.flashbots.net 427 3.48 %
agnostic-relay.net 384 3.13 %
relay.ethgas.com 165 1.35 %
relay.btcs.com 2 0.02 %
Builder (extra_data) Blocks Percent
Titan (titanbuilder.xyz) 3,355 50.70 %
BuilderNet 2,032 30.70 %
BuilderNet (Beaver) 825 12.47 %
BuilderNet (Flashbots) 645 9.75 %
BuilderNet (Nethermind) 562 8.49 %
Quasar (quasar.win) 613 9.26 %
rsync-builder.xyz 235 3.55 %
beaverbuild.org 178 2.69 %
Builder+ www.btcs.com/builder 146 2.21 %
iobuilder.xyz 18 0.27 %
bobTheBuilder.xyz 14 0.21 %
  6 0.09 %
Eureka (eurekabuilder.xyz) 6 0.09 %
0x65 3 0.05 %
Ty For The Block 2 0.03 %
BuildAI (https://buildai.net) 2 0.03 %
not duha 2 0.03 %
not duha 1 0.02 %
not duhaS 1 0.02 %
I can haz block? 1 0.02 %
Builder+ btcs.com | ethgas.com 1 0.02 %
snailbuilder.sh 1 0.02 %
banana 1 0.02 %
Builder extra_data Blocks Blocks with profit Blocks with subsidy Overall profit (ETH) Subsidies (ETH)
Titan (titanbuilder.xyz) 3,355 3,122 233 34.3584 0.2738
  6 6 0 18.9769 0.0000
BuilderNet 2,032 1,638 394 16.9109 5.3669
beaverbuild.org 178 175 3 3.6108 0.0007
Quasar (quasar.win) 613 394 211 3.4661 0.2206
rsync-builder.xyz 235 40 194 0.6927 0.4502
bobTheBuilder.xyz 14 11 0 0.2025 0.0000
BuildAI (https://buildai.net) 2 2 0 0.0114 0.0000
not duha 2 2 0 0.0004 0.0000
not duha 1 1 0 0.0002 0.0000
not duhaS 1 1 0 0.0002 0.0000
0x65 3 0 0 0.0000 0.0000
snailbuilder.sh 1 1 0 0.0000 0.0000
Ty For The Block 2 0 0 0.0000 0.0000
Builder+ btcs.com | ethgas.com 1 0 0 0.0000 0.0000
I can haz block? 1 1 0 0.0000 0.0000
banana 1 0 1 -0.0020 0.0020
Eureka (eurekabuilder.xyz) 6 1 5 -0.0104 0.0105
iobuilder.xyz 18 0 18 -0.1332 0.1332
Builder+ www.btcs.com/builder 146 6 136 -3.7043 3.7763

⚠️ Disclaimer: Relayscan uses block.coinbase ETH balance difference to measure builder's profits which could introduce inaccuracies when builders:

  • pay validator using another address
  • pay for orderflow in other channels (e.g. offchain)
  • have searching profits but use builder wallet funds to add bid value without depositing from searcher addresses