relayscan.io

MEV-Boost Stats for 2026-02-17

2026-02-17 00:00 2026-02-17 23:59 (UTC)

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Relay Payloads Percent
relay.ultrasound.money 4,029 29.83 %
titanrelay.xyz 3,339 24.72 %
bloxroute.max-profit.blxrbdn.com 2,389 17.69 %
bloxroute.regulated.blxrbdn.com 1,714 12.69 %
aestus.live 674 4.99 %
boost-relay.flashbots.net 641 4.75 %
agnostic-relay.net 514 3.81 %
relay.ethgas.com 205 1.52 %
Builder (extra_data) Blocks Percent
Titan (titanbuilder.xyz) 3,608 53.87 %
BuilderNet 1,783 26.62 %
BuilderNet (Flashbots) 859 12.83 %
BuilderNet (Beaver) 532 7.94 %
BuilderNet (Nethermind) 392 5.85 %
Quasar (quasar.win) 963 14.38 %
Eureka (eurekabuilder.xyz) 138 2.06 %
beaverbuild.org 62 0.93 %
bobTheBuilder.xyz 55 0.82 %
Builder+ www.btcs.com/builder 50 0.75 %
ethgas-realtime-rpc 9 0.13 %
Builder+ btcs.com | ethgas.com 6 0.09 %
bananabuild.org 5 0.07 %
  4 0.06 %
Ty For The Block 3 0.04 %
0x75 3 0.04 %
Powered by bloXroute 2 0.03 %
geth go1.25.4 linux 1 0.01 %
T c : T @^& p 1 0.01 %
. ! b !" 1 0.01 %
rpc.turbobuilder.xyz 1 0.01 %
snailbuilder.sh 1 0.01 %
WhiteHilt 1 0.01 %
Builder extra_data Blocks Blocks with profit Blocks with subsidy Overall profit (ETH) Subsidies (ETH)
Titan (titanbuilder.xyz) 3,608 3,245 363 69.8097 0.2192
BuilderNet 1,783 1,281 502 7.9922 0.3002
bobTheBuilder.xyz 55 55 0 2.8645 0.0000
Quasar (quasar.win) 963 532 431 0.7727 0.5714
beaverbuild.org 62 54 8 0.4326 0.0032
  4 4 0 0.0556 0.0000
0x75 3 3 0 0.0271 0.0000
rpc.turbobuilder.xyz 1 1 0 0.0076 0.0000
geth go1.25.4 linux 1 1 0 0.0020 0.0000
ethgas-realtime-rpc 9 9 0 0.0013 0.0000
snailbuilder.sh 1 1 0 0.0006 0.0000
Ty For The Block 3 3 0 0.0004 0.0000
Powered by bloXroute 2 2 0 0.0003 0.0000
WhiteHilt 1 1 0 0.0001 0.0000
Builder+ btcs.com | ethgas.com 6 0 0 0.0000 0.0000
bananabuild.org 5 0 5 -0.0100 0.0100
T c : T @^& p 1 0 1 -0.0118 0.0118
. ! b !" 1 0 1 -0.0126 0.0126
Eureka (eurekabuilder.xyz) 138 7 131 -0.2339 0.2532
Builder+ www.btcs.com/builder 50 6 42 -0.3969 0.4320

⚠️ Disclaimer: Relayscan uses block.coinbase ETH balance difference to measure builder's profits which could introduce inaccuracies when builders:

  • pay validator using another address
  • pay for orderflow in other channels (e.g. offchain)
  • have searching profits but use builder wallet funds to add bid value without depositing from searcher addresses